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in a Two Sector Two Class AgentsEconomy
Sheikh Selim
Cardi¤ University
March 2011
Abstract:
We examine the optimal taxation problem in a two sector neoclassical economy with
workers and capitalists. We show that in a steady state of this economy the optimal policy
may involve a capital income tax or subsidy, di¤erential taxation of labour income and
redistribution. The level and the direction of the redistribution associated with such an
optimal policy depends on the pre tax allocation of capital but not on the social weights
attached to the di¤erent groups of taxpayers. Excess production of consumption goods
creates a di¤erence between the social marginal values of consumption and investment
which in turns violates the production e¢ ciency condition. Such a di¤erence can be undone
by taxing capital income from the consumption sector, and with this optimal policy the
government can implement a redistribution scheme where both workers and capitalists bear
the burden of distorting taxes. On the contrary, an optimal policy that involves a capital
income subsidy in the production of consumption can implement allocations that minimize
the relative price di¤erence between consumption and investment that resulted from the
excess production of investment goods.
JEL Codes: C61, E13, E62, H21.
Keywords: Optimal taxation, Ramsey problem, Two Sector Economy, Redistribution.
1 Introduction.
In this paper we show that in a steady state of a two sector economy with two classes
of agents, the optimal policy that involves a tax/subsidy on capital income can serve the
e¢ ciency as well as the redistributive purposes. In a two sector economy the interdepen-
dence of labour and capital margins allows the government to choose an optimal policy
that taxes/subsidizes capital income from one sector. A version of this result in a two
sector model with heterogeneous agents has been discussed in Selim (2010). In this paper
we extend Selims (2010) result by showing that in a similar economy with two classes of
agents the long run optimal policy that involves a tax/subsidy on capital income can serve
the e¢ ciency as well as the redistributive purpose. This policy is optimal because it re-
stores the production e¢ ciency condition. We show that even in the extreme case where
the government cares about the welfare of only one class of agents, the optimal policy with
a capital tax/subsidy in the long run can also serve the redistributive purpose.
Typically investment su¤ers a decline during economic slowdown, and one common
scal policy response of most governments during the recent nancial crisis has been the
implementation of measures that ght such declines in investment. Such measures could
involve an increase in the accelerated capital depreciation allowances (e.g. the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008 for the US, or the Fiscal Act 2008 for the UK). The welfare as well as
the redistributive properties of accelerated capital depreciation allowances has been at the
core of tax debates in the eighties, evidence of which can be found in important papers such
as Judd (1984), Judd (1985) and later in Judd (1997). Most of these studies argue that
if there are pre-existing distortions in the economy (e.g. imperfectly competitive product
market) such scal measures can promote investment.
The distributional consequences of capital income tax policy in competitive economies
are less well known, however. The two most inuential results which are relevant to this
discussion are the ones in Chamley (1986) and in Judd (1985). Chamley (1986) shows
that in a steady state of a one sector economy, the optimal policy is to set the tax rate on
capital income equal to zero. Judd (1985) extends this result in a one sector economy with
heterogeneous agents. He shows that with zero capital income tax in the scheme, if the
government only values the welfare of workers there will not be any redistribution in the
limit, and government expenditures will be nanced solely by levying wage taxes on labour.
In this paper we extend both these results. We present a two sector neoclassical growth
model with two classes of utility maximizing agents: workers and capitalists. We consider
two production sectors that produce consumption goods (consumption sector, hereafter)
and investment goods (investment sector, hereafter), using raw labour and capital, on which
government levies distorting at-rate income taxes. We construct the classic Ramsey (1927)
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problem, i.e. the planners problem of determining the optimal settings over time for two
labour income tax rates and two capital income tax rates. Our model is thus possibly the
simplest extension of both Chamley (1986) and Judds (1985) models. In this setting we
examine the optimal policy and its distributional consequences in a steady state.
We show that in a steady state of our model, the optimal capital income tax rate in
the investment sector is zero but the optimal capital income tax rate in the consumption
sector is in general di¤erent from zero. In a two sector economy where investment and con-
sumption are produced as two nal goods, capital and labour margins are interdependent,
and so is the long run optimal policy of taxing the income from these factors. Due to this
interdependence, a long run policy that involves a tax/subsidy on capital income from one
sector can serve the e¢ ciency purpose. In a steady state of our model any di¤erence in the
relative price of investment and consumption is associated with a di¤erence in the social
marginal values of investment and consumption. A tax/subsidy on capital income in one
sector leaving the other capital income tax at a zero rate and di¤erential taxation of labour
income at tandem can undo this di¤erence which in turns restores the production e¢ ciency
condition. This result adds to the literature that argues that optimal capital income tax
may be nonzero in a variety of growth contexts, such as Kemp et al. (1993), Aiyagari
(1995), Lansing (1999), Chamley (2001), Rehme (2009), Selim (2009) and Selim (2010).
We also show that the optimal policy in a steady state that involves a tax/subsidy on
capital income can serve the redistributive purpose. Since the optimal policy in a steady
state depends crucially on the initial allocation of capital in the two sectors, any di¤erence in
the steady state price of investment and consumption allows the government to use three tax
instruments. We show that in an economy where initial allocation of capital results in low
production of new investment goods, the optimal policy for the long run should encourage
the production of investment goods by setting higher labour income tax and a tax on capital
income from the consumption sector. This way the government collects revenue from three
tax instruments, and both workers and capitalists bear the burden of taxes. On the other
hand in an economy where the initial allocation of capital results in an excess supply of new
investment goods, the optimal policy for the long run should be one that subsidizes capital
income in the consumption sector (and sets lower labour income tax in that sector). If the
government in such an economy runs a balanced budget each period, the revenue collected
from labour income taxation will be used to nance both the government purchases and
the capital income subsidy. This optimal policy therefore involves some redistribution in
the form of capital subsidy. The distributional consequences of the long run optimal policy
therefore depends crucially on how capitalists allocate capital in the initial period.
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2 The Two Sector Two Class AgentsEconomy.
Time is discrete and runs forever. There are two classes of agents, indexed by i 2 f1; 2g,
and each class is of measure 1. Agents of class 1 are workers who consume and work but do
not invest in physical capital. Agents of class 2 are capitalists who consume and invest in
physical capital but do not work. The two production sectors, the consumption sector and
the investment sector, are indexed by j 2 fC;Xg. Firms own nothing except the technology,
and they competitively hire working time from the workers and physical capital from the
capitalists in order to produce the consumption goods (the numeraire) and the investment
goods. Agents own the property rights of the rms.
We denote the wage rate and the rental price of capital in sector j by wjt and rjt,
respectively, and the relative price of investment goods by pt. Firms in the consumption
sector produce a perishable consumption good which can be used for private consumption,
cit, and government consumption, gt, such that gt = g > 0. Firms in the investment sector
produce investment goods which can be used to augment the capital stock. Both types of
agents purchase the consumption good, and only capitalists purchase the investment goods.
Both goods are traded in competitive markets.
The representative worker is endowed with one unit of time at each period, and the
representative capitalist is endowed with k20 > 0 units of capital at period 0. Working time
in sector j is denoted by n1jt. Capital is accumulated by capitalists, and the stock of capital
used in sector j is denoted by k2jt. The resource constraints are:
0  f c  k2ct; n1ct  c1t   c2t   gt (1a)
0  fx  k2xt; n1xt+ (1  )  k2ct + k2xt   k2ct+1 + k2xt+1 ;  2 (0; 1) (1b)
where the technologies f j (:) satisfy standard regularity conditions, including Inada con-
ditions and linear homogeneity. Workers like consumption and leisure streams that give
higher values of
1P
t=0
tu1
 
c1t ; 1  n1ct   n1xt

(2)
where  2 (0; 1). Workersutility function is separable in consumption and leisure, linear
in labour, and marginal disutility from working in the two sectors are same1. Capitalists
derive utility from consumption, and higher levels of consumption give higher values of
1P
t=0
tu2
 
c2t

(3)
1 It is straightforward to show that the main results we derive holds for a broader class of utility functions.
We use a simple utility function that satisfy standard regularity conditions (including Inada conditions)
mainly for tractability.
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where u2 (:) satises standard regularity conditions (including Inada conditions).
The government has four at-rate (distorting) tax instruments to raise the required
revenue: two labour income tax rates, and two capital income tax rates. The labour income
tax rates and the capital income tax rates for sector j are denoted by  jt and 
j
t , respectively.
The government also makes non-negative class-specic lump sum transfer TRit  0. The
governments budget constraints are:
0   ctwctn1ct + xtwxtn1xt + ctrctk2ct + xt rxtk2xt   gt   TR1t   TR2t (4)
We assume that the government has access to a commitment technology that allows it
to commit itself once and for all to the sequence of tax rates announced at period 0. It has
a social welfare function which is a non-negatively weighted average of individual utilities,
with the weight i  0 on class i,
2P
i=1
i = 1.
2.1 Competitive Equilibria.
Competitive pricing in the production sectors imply that factor prices are given by rct =
f ck (t) ; wct = f
c
n (t) ; rxt = ptf
x
k (t) ; and wxt = ptf
x
n (t). The representative worker chooses
allocations

c1t ; n
1
ct; n
1
xt
	1
t=0
in order to maximize expression (2) subject to the budget con-
straints:
0  ewctn1ct + ewxtn1xt + TR1t   c1t (5)
where ewjt  1   jtwjt. The consolidated rst order conditions associated to this
problem, assuming u1nc (t) = u
1
nx (t) = u
1
n (t), include (5) and:
0 = u1c (t) ewjt + u1n (t) ; j 2 fC;Xg (6)
Given k20 > 0, the representative capitalist chooses

c2t ; k
2
ct+1; k
2
xt+1
	1
t=0
in order to
maximize expression (3) subject to the budget constraints:
0  erctk2ct + erxtk2xt + (1  )  k2ct + k2xt pt + TR2t   c2t    k2ct+1 + k2xt+1 pt (7)
where erjt  1  jt rjt. The consolidated rst order conditions associated to this
problem include the transversality conditions, (7) and the Euler equations:
0 = u2c (t) 

pt
u2c (t+ 1) [erjt+1 + pt+1 (1  )] ; j 2 fC;Xg (8)
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Denition 2.1.1 A feasible allocation is a sequence

c1t ; c
2
t ; n
1
ct; n
1
xt; gt; k
2
ct; k
2
xt
	1
t=0
that sat-
ises equation (1).
Denition 2.1.2 A price system is a 5-tuple of non-negative bounded sequences fwct; wxt; rct; rxt; ptg1t=0.
Denition 2.1.3 A government policy is a 6-tuple of sequences

 ct ; 
x
t ; 
c
t ; 
x
t ; TR
1
t ; TR
2
t
	1
t=0
.
Denition 2.1.4 (Competitive Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is a feasible al-
location, a price system, and a government policy, such that (a) given the price system,
k20 > 0 and the government policy, the allocation solves both sets of the rms problems
and the agents problems, and (b) given the allocation, k20 > 0 and the price system, the
government policy satises the sequence of government budget constraints (4).
Proposition 2.1.1 For given k20 > 0, gt = g > 0, and a government policy sequencenb ct ;bxt ;bct ;bxt ;dTR1t ;dTR2to1
t=0
, the competitive equilibrium dynamics can be characterized
by a system of equations that include the transversality conditions, optimality conditions
in the production sectors, (1), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) in the set of 11 unknowns
c1t ; c
2
t ; n
1
ct; n
1
xt; k
2
ct; k
2
xt; pt; wct; wxt; rct; rxt
	1
t=0
.
Proof. Equation (1a) and (1b) represent the resource constraints. Equations (4), (5) and
(7) are the budget constraints of the government, the workers and the capitalists. For the
policy
nb ct ;bxt ;bct ;bxt ;dTR1t ;dTR2to1
t=0
, k20 > 0, gt = g > 0, and for the corresponding price
sequence f bwct; bwxt; brct; brxt; bptg1t=0, if an allocation c1t ; c2t ; n1ct; n1xt; k2ct; k2xt	1t=0 satisfy (1), (4)
and (5), it must also satisfy (7). Feasibility of the competitive equilibrium allocation thus
requires that for the price sequence f bwct; bwxt; brct; brxt; bptg1t=0 the competitive equilibrium
allocation (a set of 6 unknowns

c1t ; c
2
t ; n
1
ct; n
1
xt; k
2
ct; k
2
xt
	1
t=0
) satisfy the 6 equations, (1a),
(1b), (4), (5), and the two transversality conditions:
lim
t!1
k2jt+1
tQ
s=1
Rs
= 0; j 2 fC;Xg ; Rt 
erjt
pt
+ 1  

(9)
Equation (6) represent the intratemporal optimality condition for the workers, i.e. they
show that for intratemporal optimal allocation of consumption and working time the mar-
ginal rate of substitution of consumption and work (in sector j) must be equal to the
ratio of the price of consumption to the after tax wage (in sector j). For the policynb ct ;bxt ;bct ;bxt ;dTR1t ;dTR2to1
t=0
, combine the production sector equilibrium conditions with
(6) to derive
pt =
(1  b ct) f cn
(1  bxt ) fxn (10)
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Equation (8) represent the intertemporal optimality conditions for the capitalists, which,
combined with the production sector equilibrium conditions imply:
pt+1 =

1  bct+1 f ck (t+ 1)
1  bxt+1 fxk (t+ 1) (11)
For the price sequence f bwct; bwxt; brct; brxt; bptg1t=0, let nbc1t ;bc2t ; bn1ct; bn1xt;bk2ct;bk2xto1
t=0
repre-
sent the competitive equilibrium allocation. For
nbc1t ;bc2t ; bn1ct; bn1xt;bk2ct;bk2xto1
t=0
the competi-
tive equilibrium prices are characterized by the solution to the system comprising 4 pro-
duction sector equilibrium conditions and either (10) or (11) in the set of 5 unknowns
fwct; wxt; rct; rxt; ptg1t=0. It is trivial that for
nbc1t ;bc2t ; bn1ct; bn1xt;bk2ct;bk2xto1
t=0
, given k20; g >
0, and the competitive equilibrium prices, the policy
nb ct ;bxt ;bct ;bxt ;dTR1t ;dTR2to1
t=0
satises
(4).
2.2 Steady state.
Assume there is a steady state where competitive equilibrium allocations and prices con-
verge to constant levels. Such a steady state has some interesting characteristics. First, in a
steady state there is an interdependence of the capital and labour margins in this two sector
economy. From (6), it is straightforward to show that in a steady state the relative price
of investment goods is determined by p (1  xss) fxn = (1   css) f cn. Furthermore, (8) imply
that in a steady state, p (1  xss) fxk = (1  css) f ck . These conditions imply that in the
long run the government can only choose optimal policies that generate allocations which
together with the optimal taxes satisfy (1   css) (1  xss) fxk f cn = (1  xss) (1  css) f ckfxn .
Thus the capital and the labour income taxes that can implement the competitive equilib-
rium allocation will depend on each other.
Proposition 2.2.1 Given proposition 2.1.1, there is a unique steady state.
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Proof. Given proposition 2.1.1, for the steady state policy
 
 css; 
x
ss; 
c
ss; 
x
ss; TR
1
ss; TR
1
ss

the steady state version of the competitive equilibrium becomes:
fxk f
c
n
f ckf
x
n
=
(1  xss) (1  css)
(1   css) (1  xss)
(12a)
0 = f c
 
k2c ; n
1
c
  c1   c2   g (12b)
0 = fx
 
k2x; n
1
x
    k2c + k2x (12c)
0 = (1   css) f cnn1c + (1  xss) pfxnn1x + TR1ss   c1 (12d)
0 = (1  css) f ckk2c + (1  xss) pfxk k2x   
 
k2c + k
2
x

p+ TR2ss   c2 (12e)
1 =

p
[(1  css) f ck + p (1  )] (12f)
0 = u1c (1   css) f cn + u1n (12g)
which is a system of 7 equations that can be solved for the set of 7 unknowns
 
c1; c2; n1c ; n
1
x; k
2
c ; k
2
x; p

.
Given the solution to the steady state levels of allocations and p, it is straightforward to
derive the steady state levels of factor prices (rc; rx; wc; wx). The steady state levels of al-
locations and prices satisfy the steady state version of the governments budget constraint:
0 =  csswcn
1
c + 
x
sswxn
1
x + 
c
ssrck
2
c + 
x
ssrxk
2
x   g   TR1ss   TR2ss (13)
Corollary 2.2.1 In a steady state as in proposition 2.2.1, the tax rates that implement the
production e¢ ciency condition satisfy
(1  css)
(1  xss)
=
(1   css)
(1  xss)
(14)
In proposition 2.2.1 the steady state versions of (6) and (8) are included for only one
sector because the combined steady state condition of (6) and (8) is (12a). Given the
steady state conditions p (1  xss) fxn = (1   css) f cn and p (1  xss) fxk = (1  css) f ck , (12d)
and (12e) can be solved to derive c1 in terms of k2c , n
1
x, n
1
c and to derive c
2 in terms of
k2c ; k
2
x; n
1
c . (12g) can be solved for c
1 as a function of k2c and n
1
c , which combined with
the other solution to c1 will give a solution to n1x in terms of k
2
c and n
1
c . These solutions
combined with the three equations (12a), (12b) and (12c) gives the solution to the steady
state levels of factor allocations.
The steady state factor allocations can be used to derive the steady state levels of
consumption for workers and capitalists. The remaining steady state condition (12f) can
be solved for steady state level of p. The production e¢ ciency condition states that the
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ratio of marginal products of capital and the ratio of marginal products of labour should be
equalized across sectors, which in a steady state can be implemented by a tax policy that
satises (14).
3 The Optimal Taxation Problem.
For each set of government policy there exists a competitive equilibrium. With no lump
sum tax instrument or its equivalent in the scheme, and because of g > 0, this multiplic-
ity motivates the optimal taxation problem. We dene the optimal taxation problem as
the standard Ramsey problem and derive the conditions that characterize the Ramsey al-
location. Then we look for the taxes that can implement these second-best wedges. We
assume that the government chooses after tax returns to maximize social welfare, such that
the chosen after tax returns generate an allocation that is implementable in a competitive
equilibrium. Using the linear homogeneity property of the production functions, we rewrite
(4) as:
0 = f c
 
k2ct; n
1
ct

+ ptf
x
 
k2xt; n
1
xt
  erctk2ct  erxtk2xt  ewctn1ct  ewxtn1xt  gt TR1t  TR2t (15)
In a model with only one class of agents, say, given the preset revenue target and
k0 > 0, the Ramsey problem is the governments problem of choosing the after tax returns
that maximize welfare and generate allocations and prices that are consistent with the
competitive equilibrium behaviour of agents. Since there are two classes of agents, the
optimal taxes must generate allocations and prices that satisfy equilibrium conditions for
each class of agents.
So here the governments problem is one in which for a given g > 0; k20 > 0 and a xed
set of (c0; 
x
0) the government chooses allocations to maximize social welfare subject to (15),
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(1), (5), (6), (7) and (8). The Lagrangian corresponding to this problem is:
L =
1P
t=0
t
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1u1
 
c1t ; 1  n1ct   n1xt

+ 2u2
 
c2t

+ t
"
f c
 
k2ct; n
1
ct

+ ptf
x
 
k2xt; n
1
xt

 erctk2ct   erxtk2xt   ewctn1ct   ewxtn1xt   gt   TR1t   TR2t
#
+ct

f c
 
k2ct; n
1
ct
  c1t   c2t   gt
+xt

fx
 
k2xt; n
1
xt

+ (1  )  k2ct + k2xt   k2ct+1 + k2xt+1
+1ct

u1n (t) + u
1
c (t) ewct+ 1xt u1n (t) + u1c (t) ewxt
+2ct
h
u2c (t)  ptu2c (t+ 1) ferct+1 + pt+1 (1  )gi
+2xt
h
u2c (t)  ptu2c (t+ 1) ferxt+1 + pt+1 (1  )gi
+"1t
 ewctn1ct + ewxtn1xt + TR1t   c1t 
+"2t
erctk2ct + erxtk2xt + (1  )  k2ct + k2xt pt + TR2t   c2t    k2ct+1 + k2xt+1 pt
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(16)
where t t; 
tct; 
txt; 
t1jt; 
t2jt; 
t"1t and 
t"2t are Lagrange multipliers for (15),
(1a), (1b), (6), (8), (5), and (7), respectively. More intuitively,  denotes the shadow price
of governments resources, j denotes the shadow price of resources in sector j, 
1
j denote
the shadow price of workersintratemporal optimality condition for working in sector j, 2j
denote the shadow price of capitalistsintertemporal optimality condition for investing in
sector j, and "i denotes the shadow price of class i0s resources.
The Ramsey problems rst order conditions with respect to k2ct+1, k
2
xt+1, n
1
ct and n
1
xt
are:
xt + "
2
t pt = 
(
 t+1 [f
c
k (t+ 1)  erct+1] + ct+1f ck (t+ 1) + xt+1 (1  )
+"2t+1 [erct+1 + pt+1 (1  )]
)
(17a)
xt + "
2
t pt = 
(
 t+1 [pt+1f
x
k (t+ 1)  erxt+1] + xt+1 [fxk (t+ 1) + 1  ]
+"2t+1 [erxt+1 + pt+1 (1  )]
)
(17b)
1u1n (t) = ewct   t   "1t   ( t + ct) f cn (t) (17c)
1u1n (t) = ewxt   t   "1t   ( tpt + xt) fxn (t) (17d)
3.1 Optimal Policy in a Steady State.
Our concentration is on the optimal policy in the long run, which is why we will focus on
9
a steady state of the Ramsey optimum. The steady state versions of (17a) and (17b) are:
x + p"
2

1  

(1  css) f ck
p
+ 1  

=  [ f ck
c
ss + cf
c
k + x (1  )] (18a)
x + p"
2 [1   f(1  xss ) fxk + 1  g] =  [ pfxk xss + x (fxk + 1  )] (18b)
The constraints (5), (6), (7), (8) and the resource constraints (1) in the Ramsey problem
ensure that in a steady state the optimal taxes generate a set of allocations (the Ramsey
allocations) which are an element in the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. Al-
locations that are consistent with (18a) and (18b) therefore must be allocations that are
consistent with the steady state versions of competitive equilibrium condition (12f) and
1 =  f(1  xss) fxk + 1  g (19)
respectively. Similarly, allocations consistent with the steady state versions of (17c) and
(17d) must be allocations that are consistent with (12g) and
0 = u1c (1  xss) pfxn + u1n (20)
respectively.
Proposition 3.1.1 In a steady state the optimal tax rates are given by:
(1  xss ) = 1; (1  css) = 1 +
1
 

c   x
fxn
f cn

(1  xss )

1u1c +
 
   "1 ff cn ( + c)  xfxng
f cn ( + c)

=  ; (1   css)

1u1c +
 
   "1 =  + c
Proof. Since the optimal taxes generate the allocations that satisfy both (18b) and (19),
the optimal taxes and the allocations must satisfy x [1   (fxk + 1  )] =  fxk pxss , and
since 

x
p +  

6= 0, together with (19) it implies that xss = 0: Similar steps using (18a)
and (12f) give:
x [1   (1  )] =  [ f ckcss + cf ck ] (21)
which, together with (12f) imply that the optimal capital income tax rate in the con-
sumption sector is given by:
(1  css)

x
p
+  

=  + c (22)
In a steady state, the optimal tax policy must be consistent with the equilibrium price
of investment goods, which is given by p (1  xss) fxn = (1   css) f cn. Substituting for the
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equilibrium price in (22) we derive
(1  css) =
( + c) (1   css) f cn
x (1  xss) fxn +  (1   css) f cn
(23)
which holds for any steady state policy ( css; 
x
ss).
It is straightforward to verify that the steady state version of (17c) and (12g) and the
steady state version of (17d) and (20) imply that the optimal labour income tax rates are
given by (1   css) =  +c1u1c+(  "1) and (1  
x
ss ) =
 
1u1c+
(  "1)
fcn( +c)
[fcn( +c) xfxn ]
. Substitute
these in (23) to derive (1  css) = 1 + 1 

c   x f
x
n
fcn

.
Proposition 3.1.2 In a steady state, css = 0 if and only if  css = xss , 
c
ss 6= 0 otherwise.
Proof. From proposition 3.1.1, in a steady state optimal labour income taxes satisfy
1 xss
1 css =
 
 +c  f
x
n
fcn
x
, and xss =  css if and only if
c
x
= f
x
n
fcn
. The optimal capital income tax
rate in the consumption sector is given by (1  css) = 1 + 1 

c   x f
x
n
fcn

, and css = 0 if
and only if cx =
fxn
fcn
.
4 The Intuition.
Substituting (19) in (18b) gives the steady state condition that characterizes the optimal
and implementable allocation of capital in the investment sector:
x =  [ (rx   erx) + x (fxk + 1  )] (24)
Equation (24) states that a marginal increment of capital in the investment sector in-
creases the quantity of capital by the amount (fxk + 1  ), which has social marginal value
equal to x. In addition, there is an increase in tax revenues (equal to 
x
ssrx) enabling
the government to reduce other taxes by the same amount. Since  is the shadow price
of the governments resources, the reduction of this excess burden equals  (rx   erx). The
sum of the two e¤ects is discounted by , and the discounted e¤ect is equal to the social
marginal value of investment goods, x. In a steady state the optimal policy is to set
xss = 0, and therefore investment in the investment sector is consistent with the condi-
tion 1 =  (fxk + 1  ), which characterizes the socially optimal allocation of capital in the
investment sector.
In a steady state the optimal capital income tax rate in the consumption sector is
therefore nonzero in general, and zero only conditionally. Unlike a one sector model where
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the nal good is either consumed or invested in capital, in the current setting capital is a
good produced in a di¤erent sector. This is why capital and labour margins in equilibrium
are interdependent. It is therefore the initial allocation of capital across the two sectors
that determines the social marginal values of investment (vis a vis the equilibrium price
of the investment goods) and consumption in a steady state. Due to this interdependence,
the equilibrium price of investment goods depend on the optimal policy of taxing labour
income and the equilibrium labour margins.
In addition, from (12a) and corollary 2.2.1 it is clear that in a steady state the optimal
policy of taxing income from capital and income from labour are also interdependent. Due
to this, there exists a unique equilibrium price of investment goods, or more simply a
unique condition explaining the social marginal values of consumption and investment (i.e.
cf
c
n = xf
x
n ) for which a zero capital income tax rate in the consumption sector is in
the set of optimal policies. The zero capital income tax policy is therefore one of many
implementable optimal policies, supported by the optimal policy that involves equal labour
income tax rates across the two sectors. For any other set of allocations, the government can
set a tax/subsidy on capital income from the consumption sector and can use di¤erential
labour income taxation to undo the tax distortions.
From proposition 3.1.2 in a steady state c =
x
p , css = 0. This implies that a zero
capital income tax rate in the consumption sector is optimal if and only if p = xc , i.e.
css = 0 is optimal if and only if the relative price of investment goods is equal to the ratio
of the social marginal value of investment to the social marginal value of consumption.
Substituting (12f) in (21) and rearranging, we derive:
x =  [ (rc   erc) + cf ck + x (1  )] (25)
Suppose the initial allocation of capital is such that in a steady state of the Ramsey
equilibrium, p = xc and the consequent optimal policy involves 
c
ss = 0. In such a case (25)
together with p = xc imply:
1 = 

c
x
f ck + 1  

(26)
The zero capital income tax policy (for the consumption sector) is optimal only if the
resulting allocations replicate the socially optimal allocation of capital in the consumption
sector, for which 1 =  (f ck + 1  ) must hold. Together with (26) this implies that in a
steady state the zero capital income tax policy generates an allocation that is consistent
with cx = 1, i.e. an allocation consistent with p = 1.
We now explain the converse, i.e. if in a steady state the price of investment goods and
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the price of consumption goods are equal, the optimal policy is to set css = 0. Say the
initial allocation of capital across the two sectors is such that in a steady state p = 1. From
(22),
(1  css) (x +  ) = ( + c) (27)
This now denes the steady state optimal capital income tax policy for the consumption
sector. This policy must satisfy the steady state conditions
1 = 

 + c
 + x

f ck + 1  

(28a)
x = 

 f ck

1 

 + c
 + x

+ cf
c
k + x (1  )

(28b)
which are derived by substituting (27) in (12f) and (25). Equations (28a) and (28b)
together imply that the optimal policy in a steady state implements the socially optimal
level of capital if it is consistent with the condition ( + c) = ( + x). Together with
(27) this implies that the only optimal policy that satises this condition is to set css = 0.
If initial allocation of capital across sectors is such that in a steady state the price of
investment goods and the price of consumption goods are not equal (i.e. p 6= 1), the gov-
ernment can implement the optimal policy that taxes/subsidizes capital income in the con-
sumption sector and taxes labour income from the two sectors at di¤erent rates. Following
corollary 2.2.1 if there is no di¤erence in the relative price of the two goods, the policy that
satises the production e¢ ciency condition must involve xss = 0, 
c
ss = 0, 
c
ss = 
x
ss. This
policy is one of many implementable Ramsey policies, and it is the optimal policy only if
p = 1. For all other cases, the optimal policy involves xss = 0, (1  css) (1  xss) = (1   css)
with  css 6= xss.
4.1 The initial allocation of capital and the long run optimal policy.
Say the capitalists allocate the initial stock of capital in a way that the economy reaches a
steady state with an ine¢ ciently large production of consumption goods and low production
of investment goods, such that investment goods are more expensive than consumption
goods (i.e. p > 1). If a new policy is designed in this steady state (as the initial period), in
the long run the optimal policy should be chosen to encourage more production of investment
goods. This can be accomplished by choosing an optimal policy that sets xss = 0; 
c
ss > 0
and  css > 
x
ss. This policy encourages the capitalists to shift more capital and the workers
to shift more working hours to the investment sector (because of the advantages of a zero
capital income tax and a lower labour income tax in this sector), which in turns increases
the production of investment goods. Higher production of investment goods minimizes the
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relative price di¤erence. Following corollary 2.2.1 this optimal policy is perfectly consistent
with (14), and therefore it restores production e¢ ciency.
Consider another example where the capitalists want to buy investment goods at a
cheaper price than consumption good. Suppose they allocate the initial level of capital in a
way that the economy reaches a steady state with ine¢ ciently large production of investment
goods, and p < 1. If that steady state is the initial period when the government designs
a new policy, the long run optimal policy is one that sets xss = 0; 
c
ss < 0 and 
c
ss < 
x
ss,
which encourages the capitalists to shift capital and the workers to shift working time from
the investment sector to the consumption sector. This long run policy thus results in a
new steady state with relatively higher production of consumption goods. It minimizes the
relative price di¤erence and because of its validity with (14) it restores production e¢ ciency.
Consider (25), which states that a marginal increment of capital in the consumption
sector increases the quantity of consumption goods by the amount f ck , which has social
marginal value equal to c. This increment is adjusted by capital depreciation in the
investment sector, which has social marginal value equal to x. The aggregate increment
in the quantity of available consumption goods in social marginal value terms is equal to
[cf
c
k + x (1  )]. The rst term is due to an increase in capital in the consumption sector,
while the second terms stands for an indirect increase in production of consumption goods
through an increase in depreciated capital in the investment sector. This is obvious since
with xss = 0 it is best to keep depreciated capital in the investment sector. The increased
tax revenue, equal to (rc   erc), enables the government to reduce other taxes by the same
amount, and the reduction of this excess burden in terms of governments resources is equal
to  (rc   erc). The sum of these e¤ects is discounted, and is equal to the social marginal
value of the available capital, i.e new investment goods.
It is therefore optimal to set zero tax rate on capital income from the consumption sector
when the social marginal value of investment and the social marginal value of consumption
are same, implying in turns that their relative prices are same. Any di¤erence in the social
marginal value of these two is reected in a di¤erence in the relative price of investment
goods. With a zero tax rate on capital income from the investment sector in the scheme,
the only optimal policy that can implement the di¤erence in the social marginal values of
consumption and investment (vis a vis a relative price di¤erence) involves a tax/subsidy to
capital income in the consumption sector and di¤erential labour income tax rates.
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4.2 Redistribution.
We will focus on redistribution properties of the optimal policy in a limiting steady state,
and thus we will not present any discussion about how much redistribution is accomplished
along the transition. In deciding the optimal policy, 2 plays no role, and thus we can
conduct the analysis from the point of view where the government cares only about the
welfare of the workers, i.e. 1 > 2 = 0.
We rst consider the special case that extends the ndings of Judd (1985) in our setting.
Suppose that the initial allocation of capital across sectors is such that the equilibrium price
of investment good and equilibrium price of consumption goods are same, and therefore in
a steady state the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in both sectors. With this optimal
policy, the government collects all revenue that is required to nance its purchases by levying
labour income taxes, and the labour income tax rates across sectors is same. So the entire
burden of tax is on the workers. In this case (and even if the government values only the
welfare of the workers) there will not be any redistribution in the limit. Judd (1985) nds
a similar conclusion using a one sector economy with workers and capitalists.
Now consider the case where the initial allocation of capital across sectors are such that
investment goods are more expensive than consumption goods. As we have discussed before,
starting at this particular steady state the governments long run objective is design a tax
policy that encourages production of investment goods. The long run optimal policy now
involves a tax on capital income from the consumption sector, zero tax on capital income
from the investment sector and di¤erential labour income taxation with a higher labour
income tax in the consumption sector. With this optimal policy, the government collects
revenue from three tax instruments, and both the workers and the capitalists bear the
burden of taxes. This happens even if the government only values the welfare of workers.
Therefore, with this optimal policy there is a redistribution in the limit. Rehme (2009)
shows a similar result in a neoclassical framework with incomplete income taxation where
he argues that in a steady state capital income taxes and redistribution may be nonzero and
this depends on among others the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers.
In the current setting this result is not conditional on the social weight.
If the economy starts at a steady state where investment goods are cheaper than con-
sumption goods, the long run optimal policy involves a zero tax on capital income from
the investment sector, a subsidy to capital income from the consumption sector and dif-
ferential labour income taxation with lower labour income tax in the consumption sector.
In this case the government collects revenue from two labour income tax instruments. The
revenue collected from labour income taxation will be used to nance both the government
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purchases and the capital subsidy. Since there is no lump sum tax or its equivalent, this
optimal policy involves some redistribution in the limit in the form of capital subsidy. The
capital subsidy is part of the optimal policy only in the case where the economy starts with
ine¢ ciently large production of investment goods. This will happen if capitalists allocate
large proportion of the initial capital in the production of investment goods. This pushes
the private return to capital to a level that is lower than the socially optimal level. This
ine¢ ciency in production can be undone by subsidizing income from capital in the con-
sumption sector. This policy will boost the production of consumption goods and reduce
the production of investment goods. Since direct subsidies to capital income is potentially
associated with negative marginal incentive e¤ect of capital accumulation, during economic
slowdown one possible way to implement such a policy would be to increase the acceler-
ated capital depreciation allowance. Our analysis shows that such scal measures can be
associated with some redistribution.
5 Conclusion.
We examine optimal income taxation in a two sector economy with two classes of agents:
workers and capitalists. We contribute by showing that in a steady state of this economy the
optimal capital income tax rate in the consumption sector is in general di¤erent from zero
and this policy can serve both the e¢ ciency and the redistributive purposes. Any di¤erence
in the social marginal value of investment and the social marginal value of consumption
is reected in the relative price di¤erence between the same, and such a di¤erence can be
implemented by the optimal policy that has zero tax on capital income from the investment
sector, a tax/subsidy on capital income from the consumption sector, and di¤erent rates
of labour income taxes across sectors. Such a long run optimal policy can serve both the
e¢ ciency and the redistributive purposes. The level and the direction of the redistribution is
completely independent of the social weight attached to the particular groups of taxpayers.
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